Gary North's REALITY CHECK
Published on December 16, 2003 By Wahkonta Anathema In History
The article that follows is excerpted from the site linked. With the exception of his mention of federal use of revenues, I find it a angle of research which is definitely going to get controlled-media attention. the thesis addresses an aspect of freemasonic modus operandi as well and I willbe glad to discuss this issue with any who post comment. I may be reached by e-mail at: wahkonta@graffiti.net. Thanks for the read and Blog On.
ARTICLE EXCERPT BEGINS HERE
-Caveat Lector-

Gary North's REALITY CHECK

Issue 301 December 16, 2003


THE TERRORIST CELL GROUP

I want to discuss something that you rarely read
about. Given what has happened in Iraq since last April,
and what will happen between now and May 30, when the U.S.
will turn over power to the new Iraqi government, there
should be a lot of discussion about the cell group. There
won't be. It is a topic of very limited interest, except
for specialists in revolutionary organizations and old-time
anti-Communists who devoted time decades ago to a study of
Communist subversion.

Western Revolutionary groups adopted the cell group no
later than the years immediately preceding the French
Revolution. It existed in the Middle East centuries
earlier. The masters of the cell group have been
revolutionary Muslims. Their use of the structure goes
back to the 12th century: the Assassins. This group was
Shi'ite in its theology. They were a well-organized, secret
society that was devoted to killing Sunni leaders. Bernard
Lewis, America's most respected historian of Islam, writes
in his book, "The Assassins" (1968): "In one respect the
Assassins are without precedent -- in the planned,
systematic long-term use of terror as a political weapon"
(p. 129). Their founder and mythical leader was called the
Old Man of the Mountain. I am convinced that Osama bin
Laden has self-consciously cultivated this tradition for
his purposes, which are not anti-Sunni but anti-Western.

The cell group has secrecy as its supreme priority.
The archetypal cell group is a triad: a leader under the
authority of a superior cell group member, plus two
followers, each of whom seeks to create one or more cells.
Sometimes the members do not know each others names. In
the Communist cells in Washington in the 1930s, this was
often the case. Whittaker Chambers did not know Alger Hiss
as Hiss.

The organizational features of a cell are these: (1)
screening of unauthorized outsiders; (2) absolute loyalty
to the senior member; (3) secrecy regarding one's
subordinates in spin-off cells; (4) secrecy regarding one's
partners in a superior cell. Thus, if one cell is
infiltrated by the authorities, the information available
to the infiltrator is limited mainly to that cell.
Screening usually involves some form of initiation process:
oath, deviant act, ritual.

There are two main ways to understand the operations
of secret societies, which include cell groups: (1) follow
the money and (2) follow the oath.


FOLLOW THE MONEY

The old rule in finding out what some nice-sounding
liberal activist group was up to was this: find out who the
treasurer was. If he was a known Communist, that's who set
policy. "Follow the money" was not a slogan invented by Deep
Throat to assist Woodward and Bernstein in investigating
Watergate.

When Saddam Hussein was captured, he had $750,000 in
cash. There were two men with him, we are told. This was
a typical triad. If the American interrogators cannot
locate cell hierarchies under those two men, this indicates
that Hussein was out of the loop. He maintained secrecy by
shrinking the number of men close to him. The age-old
problem of the cell group is maintaining secrecy. The
larger the cell, the more difficult it is to maintain
secrecy. Someone probably tipped off the Americans as to
where he was hiding. The best way to break a cell is not
to infiltrate it. It's cheaper to pay an existing member
to become an informant.

At the end, Hussein was acting almost alone. He
produced audiotapes, but there seems to have been no chain
of command from him to armed subordinates. This was to be
expected. His former rule was based on public control of
money and a system of discipline. A man who had ruled with
state power for 35 years was unlikely to have created a
rival system of hierarchical control designed to operate in
resistance mode. That would have created another level of
risk for him: a second chain of command that could produce
potential rivals. That system would also have been much
more ready to use assassination as a method.

There is no doubt that the attacks on our troops are
being conducted by people with access to low-technology
weapons. There is money coming into these groups. The
sources are unknown. The potential supply of weapons is
huge. Unguarded weapons dumps are located all over Iraq.
A UPI story that ran in "The Washington Times" (Oct 15)
reported:

The U.S. military now says Iraq's army had nearly
a million tons of weapons and ammunition, which
is half again as much as the 650,000 tons Gen.
John P. Abizaid, the senior U.S. commander in the
Persian Gulf region, estimated only two weeks
ago.

Officials also say Saddam stockpiled at least
5,000 shoulder-fired missiles, and fewer than a
third have been recovered. They fear many have
been smuggled out of the country and may have
fallen into the hands of terrorists.

"There are more sites than we can guard," an
allied official said. "We are destroying them as
fast as we can, but we are finding more and more
every day."

http://washingtontimes.com/upi-breaking/20031014-075627-8540r.htm

When Hussein was on the run, it would have been
possible for the military to blame the attacks on his
leadership, but hardly anyone did. There was ready
acknowledgment that the acts were being committed by small
groups. The field marshal, if any, is supposedly his
second in command, who is still at large. But there is no
evidence offered to prove this connection. The
Administration blames terrorists who have come to Iraq
secretly, along with Ba'athist Party die-hards.

What is not discussed publicly is the possibility that
these resistance groups are made up of late-blooming anti-
Americans who regard our troops as occupation forces. If
the attacks are coming mainly from these home-grown cells,
then the attacks will continue.

The attacks are coming mainly in Sunni-dominated areas
of the country. This doesn't point to the presence of a
Shi'ite secret society. It points to more traditional
resistance groups: civilians who are using random attacks
to wear down the Americans' will to occupy. It is the
local will to resist vs. foreign occupation forces.

The Iraqis know that Western democracies, other than
the State of Israel, do not have the same degree of staying
power that the USSR had, and the USSR was beaten by the
Afghans. Then it disintegrated. The attacks are going to
continue, just as they continue inside the State of Israel.
The guerilla's war of the flea is the most cost-effective
way to drive out an invader. It is also a way to get
revenge. Do not downplay this motivation.

The Administration has said that it will turn over
ruling authority to a new Iraqi government on May 30. How
a democratic government will not lead to Shi'ite
domination, no one in the Administration has said. How the
Kurds will be kept in the system is also a mystery. The
transfer process has been speeded up in preparation for the
2004 election next November.

The big questions now are these: (1) whose troops will
serve as peacemakers, the U.S. or NATO? (2) Whose money
will fund most of the rebuilding, U.S. taxpayers' or
Europe's taxpayers? (3) Will NATO take charge if America
refuses to allow contractors in Germany, France, and Russia
to bid on these projects, estimated at almost $20 billion,
as the Administration declared a week ago?

The Pentagon's bidding process has been delayed again
-- no explanation. There is a lot of ducking and weaving
going on in Washington.

http://www.forbes.com/markets/newswire/2003/12/15/rtr1180961.html

This all has to do with the Federal deficit. It looks
as though the deficit will remain above $400 billion in
fiscal 2004. This means that the Federal government will
absorb the equivalent of 4% to 5% of the Gross Domestic
Product. Money lent to the government is not lent to
private businesses. This will unquestionably retard the
economic recovery process. It is capital, not Federal
Reserve credit, that creates wealth.


FOLLOW THE OATH

The other guideline for tracing the history of secret
societies is to follow the oath. Some binding confession
operates as a screening device in every revolutionary
secret society. The oath may be theological. It may be
racial or national. But it exists. Without it, the
organization cannot maintain discipline, which begins with
the self-discipline of the oath.

Because nothing factual has been published regarding
the organization or membership of the groups that are
attacking our troops, we don't know if the oath is Islamic,
implying al-Qaeda's presence, or Sunni, or Iraqi
nationalist. If it is the last, then the attacks may
cease when there is a complete transfer of power. But such
a transfer is highly unlikely. There is too much oil to be
protected in the ground and shipped by pipelines that even
today are being blown up, although Western media give
little coverage to this fact. Paul Bremer has said that
these attacks are costing Iraq $7 billion a year in lost
revenues. The pipeline bombings are steady.

Nov. 24
http://www.zaman.com/default.php?kn=5243

Oct. 16
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,100303,00.html

Sept 8
http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/ssistory.mpl/special/iraq/2087438

Aug 18
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/iraq_08-18-03.html

There is very little possibility that control over oil
will be surrendered to any Iraqi government in the next few
years. If control is surrendered and foreign troops leave,
then the war was not mainly about oil. Watch what the
government does, not what it says.

To infiltrate an oath-bound Islamic secret society
that is dedicated to the removal of Westerners from Iraq
will prove extremely difficult. There will be a few
informants, but in the case of a $25 million reward, it
took eight months to capture Hussein. There will be no
similar incentive for informing on clandestine groups.
There are always informants, but the fact that no assassin
has been put on trial yet, let alone convicted, for any
of the hundreds of deaths of coalition troops, let alone
Iraqi police and civilians, indicates that the cell system
is alive and well in Iraq.

An Islamic oath makes it difficult for an informer to
reveal a cell's secrets without betraying Islam. The only
oath with anywhere near the same degree of commitment is an
oath to Iraq as a nation. Again, Western intelligence
organizations will find it almost impossible to get
informants to violate this oath. There is no equal
commitment in Iraq to the ideals of democracy or economic
growth to justify such a betrayal.
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